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Paul Ricoeur is widely regarded as among the most important
philosophers of  the 20th century. He is a prolific author of  30 books
and over 500 articles that contribute to most of  the major philosophical
movements from the 1940s to the present, including existentialism,
phenomenology, hermeneutics, philosophy of  language, narrative
theory, philosophy of  religion, and moral and political philosophy. It
is, therefore, surprising that he has so little to say about the philosophy
of  technology given the popularity of  the subject among
phenomenologists and Marxists in the 1960s. On the few occasions
when Ricoeur did discuss technology, he generally agreed with
Heidegger, Marcuse, and Habermas, each of  whom contrasts the
dehumanizing characteristics of  technology and technological reasoning
with more humane forms of  experience and action. Ricoeur
incorporated the views of  these philosophers without adding much
new to the study of  technology. In the 1980s when a new generation
of  philosophers turned their attention to the empirical dimensions of
technology, Ricoeur had even less to say on the subject. He either ignored
the recent developments entirely or he continued to address the subject
using older, dated, frameworks from the Sixties. This is unfortunate
because Ricoeur’s works would be enhanced if  he read in the philosophy
of  technology just as much as the philosophy of  technology would
benefit if  Ricoeur were to join in the conversation.
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The Philosophy of  Paul Ricoeur
There are five aspects in Ricoeur’s work that are relevant to
the philosophy of  technology: hermeneutic philosophy, post-Hegelian-
Kantian methodology, narrative theory, philosophy of  the self, and a
moral-political philosophy.
First is “hermeneutics,” a term Ricoeur has used to describe
the kind philosophy he has practiced since about 1960, beginning with
the publication of  the Symbolism of  Evil.1 Hermeneutics for Ricoeur is
the interpretation of  signs, symbols, and texts that relate us to the
world and impose an indirect or interpretive approach to knowledge.
What distinguishes hermeneutics from phenomenology is the rejection
of  any claim to immediate, intuitive knowledge of  the world grounded
in subjective self-certainty. Interpretation is always limited, prejudiced,
linguistic, and contextual. Ricoeur’s version of  hermeneutics is geared
toward the interpretation of  human works and other symbolically-
mediated endeavors. As opposed to the “short-route” taken by
Heidegger from hermeneutics to ontology, Ricoeur posits that
hermeneutics must take a “long route” or a “detour” through language
before it reaches its destination. The idea of  a detour as a hermeneutical
technique for reading signs of  experience through something else is
one of  Ricoeur’s favorite metaphors which reappears throughout his
career. Ricoeur once said that the “detour/return is the rhythm of  my
philosophical respiration.”2
By the 1970s, Ricoeur replaced signs and symbols with the
text as the model for the linguistic mediation of  experience. Unlike
spoken language, where meaning is more clearly related to the speaker,
the listener, and the dialogical situation, written language has a meaning
independent of  the author, original audience, and original situation.
Understanding the meaning of  writing is a more explicitly interpretive
act. The hermeneutics of  texts also applies to actions because like texts,
actions are also readable, with meanings that are distanced from the
intentions of  the actors, and subject to conflicting interpretations. In
the same way that a text becomes detached from its author, an action is
detached from its agent and may take on unintended meanings of  its
own. Ricoeur believes that if  human action can be read and interpreted
like written works then the methods and practices of  textual
interpretation can function as a paradigm for the interpretation of
action for the social sciences. Texts and actions have underlying
structures to be explained as well as social meanings to be understood.3
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The second aspect, closely related to the first, is Ricoeur’s
unique method of philosophical mediation, what he calls a “post-
Hegelian Kantian” philosophy. A post-Hegelian Kantian accepts Hegel’s
critiques of  Kant, yet, like Kant, refuses to reconcile the dualism that
haunts our understanding of  self, nature, and God. A post-Hegelian
Kantian recognizes the importance of  the concept of  totality but not
to the point where social, political, and religious integration become
the conditions for rational reflection. Ricoeur believes it is important
to limit the scope of  reflection for the sake of  critique. He attempts to
preserve universal rationality and particular, historic, and temporal
contingency. This means contrasting philosophical positions in such a
way that highlights and preserves differences, resists the temptation to
synthesize a new unity, and yet carefully suggests ways that opposites
could be seen as related. Ricoeur’s “third way” between Kant and Hegel
recognizes the aporetic quality of  human experience and respects the
plurality of  voices and conflicting interpretations, while at the same
time affirming the ability of  philosophy to find reason.4
 The third aspect of  Ricoeur’s works is a narrative theory.
Ricoeur’s thesis in Time and Narrative is that a (hermeneutic) circle exists
between human experience and narration: experience has a pre-narrative
quality that is meaningfully and coherently organized into a story by
means of a plot.5 Time becomes human time to the extent that it is
organized after the manner of  a narrative; narrative, in turn, is
meaningful to the extent that it portrays the features of  temporal
experience. The basic feature of  a narrative is a plot, which is the glue
that holds a story together. The plot picks out, orders, and assigns
significance to otherwise random and disparate elements by arranging
them into an intelligible whole. This structuring activity is what gives
the story a meaning and what allows it make its point. In light of  narrative
theory, hermeneutics for Ricoeur is construed as the telling, writing,
and understanding of  fictional and non-fictional stories, in effect, linking
time, narrative, and history.
The fourth aspect of  Ricoeur’s work is a philosophy of
subjectivity. Philosophy for Ricoeur is essentially a reflective process
of  questioning and clarifying the meaning of  our existence. The subject
of  reflection is not a self-transparent cogito that functions as an ultimate
foundation for reason. Instead self-understanding is mediated by signs,
symbols, and language, and, therefore, requires an indirect method of
interpretation – i.e., a hermeneutic philosophy. Narrative theory
continues this tradition of  reflective philosophy with the notion of  a
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“narrative identity.” Ricoeur’s thesis is that we understand a person’s
identity as we would a character in a fictional or historical narrative.
One’s identity is formed by the stories one tell about one’s self, as well
as the stories told by other people in our lives like parents, spouses,
friends, and enemies. The identity of  a group, culture, or nation is also
a recounted story. These collective identities require that their members
be convinced of  the truth and rightness of  their story. To be effective,
these narratives have to shape how the members understand themselves
as parts of  a group. Ricoeur is particularly interested in stories of
founding events that establish and maintain communities and nations
but that also sustain hatred and conflict with others.6
The fifth aspect of  Ricoeur’s work is his moral philosophy.
To put it crudely, moral philosophy for Ricoeur is a version of
Aristotelian practical wisdom tested by Kantian deontology. The “ethical
intention” is to aim at the good life, with and for others, in just
institutions. Practical wisdom, on his account, is the art of  mediating
the particular requirement of  the (Aristotelian) ethical aim and the
universal requirement of  the (Kantian) moral norm in order to achieve
happiness, autonomy, and justice. Ricoeur proposes three theses with
respect to ethics and morality: 1) The primacy of  ethics over morality;
2) the necessity that the ethical aim be mediated by the moral norm;
and 3) the recourse morality must seek in ethics to resolve conflicts
and aporias. Ethics encompasses morality – yet morality is a necessary,
deontological moment of  the actualization of  ethics. The reason why
ethics needs morality is to ensure that ethical life respects the autonomy
and dignity of  every individual. The reason why morality needs ethics
is two-fold: 1) Without ethics morality would be empty; ethics is founded
on and presupposes our desire to live well together with others. 2)
When deontological norms produces conflicting obligations – as they
inevitably do – we must refer back to the ethical aim of  a particular
good life in order to figure out what to do. Sometimes there is no right
answer to a moral problem. If  moral judgment were simply a matter
of  balancing the ethical aim and moral norm there would be no room
for “the tragedy of  action,” exemplified in stories like that of  Antigone.
It is in these intractable situations that the art of  practical wisdom
helps us make decisions and act justly and appropriately in the face of
tragic situations.7
The hallmark of  Ricoeur’s philosophy is his emphasis on the
fragility of  the human condition. In his early existentialist work, Fallible
Man, he argues that there is a basic disproportion in human beings
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between our finite and infinite dimensions – between what we are as
limited and embodied beings and what we are as rational and infinitely
creative beings.8 By reason of  this disproportion, we are never wholly
at one with ourselves and hence we can go wrong. We are fallible. This
fallibility not only makes human evil possible but also human goodness,
knowledge, and achievement. Ricoeur’s work since then continues to
remind us of  our fallibility and fragility. He proposes not solutions, but
creative, practical responses to cope with our limitations. Because we
are limited, incomplete, and imperfect, so are our responses. Everything
is fragile; none of  our undertakings can be completely justified. Ricoeur
reminds us to be humble – but also to be responsible and respond as
best we can.
The Philosophy of  Technology
Philosophy of  technology is a critical, reflective examination
of  the nature of  technology as well as the effects of  technologies upon
human knowledge, activities, societies, and environments. The aim of
the philosophy of  technology is to understand, evaluate, and criticize
the ways in which technologies reflect as well as change human life,
individually, socially, and politically. The assumption underlying the
philosophy of  technology is that technology not only extends our
capacities and affects changes in the natural and social worlds but also
does so in ways that are interesting with respect to fundamental areas
of  philosophical inquiry. The task for a philosophy of  technology is to
analyze the phenomena of  technology, its significance, and the ways
that it mediates and transforms our experience.
The major 20th Century philosophers of  technology,
Heidegger, Marcuse, and other existentialists and Western Marxists,
tended to lay out transcendental perspectives on technology, or theories
that account for the very conditions of  making and using instruments.
They treated technology as a singular phenomenon with a rationale
that is radically different from that found in the social world. These
early philosophers of  technology contrasted the detached objectivity
of  technological rationality with a more humane forms of  experience
that are connected to, not severed from, the natural and social worlds.
According to this approach, the problem with objective, neutral,
“techniques” of  knowledge is that they treat the entire social world as
an object of  control. These philosophers worried about the fate of
human beings when managed and handled as mere technological
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problems. They criticized technological thinking and suggested humane
alternatives to dehumanizing technological societies.
Recent philosophy of  technology has taken an “empirical turn”
away from the transcendental orientation of  the early philosophy of
technology and toward a more practical, contextualized interpretation.9
As opposed to the early pessimistic assessments of a singular
technological rationality, philosophers since the 1980s tend to view
technology empirically and historically, in terms of  its actual uses in
social contexts. Technology is now seen as inter-dependent with society
rather than independent of  it. Recent philosophy of  technology
examines the way that our technologies form the background, context,
and medium for our lives, shaping our culture and the environment,
altering patterns of  human activity, and influencing who we are and
how we live. If  there is a single, over-arching theme to recent philosophy
of  technology, it is the attempt to find a balance between the technical
and social aspects of  technology. If  the narrowly construed
“instrumental” meaning of  technology understands it only terms of
technical properties, techniques, and precise knowledge, the broader
(and more accurate) understanding of  technology includes the full range
of  cultural, economic, political, and legal dimensions – in addition to
technical factors – that form the technological character of  a society.
The task for the philosophy of  technology is to examine and evaluate
the various ways that technical artifacts and systems figure into our
lives.
What Ricoeur Adds to the Philosophy of  Technology
Ricoeur belongs to the tradition that equates technology with
domination and control. In the early 1960s Ricoeur warns of  “the
conquest of  the economy by . . . the same rationality that was previously
at work in technology and in the sciences.”10 Both welfare state capitalism
and state socialism subordinate the social-political and culture
dimensions to “dehumanizing calculation” and “technocracy.” The task
facing us, he argues, is to begin a process that would subject technology
and the economy to democratic processes in order to restore our lost
humanity and shattered cultural heritage. If  we fail we will face increasing
“anonymity and dehumanization,” “barbaric forms of  urbanism,” and
“the leveling of  tastes and talents by the technique of  consumption
and leisure.”11
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In his 1961 article, “Universal Civilization and National
Cultures,” Ricoeur contrasts the dehumanizing effects of  scientific-
technological-political progress with the “creative nucleus” of  a cultural
heritage.12 Universal civilization has a positive sense and a negative sense.
The positive sense is that science and technology can help humanity
achieve global harmony through “world-wide technics.” The application
of  science in technology, in conjunction with techniques of  economic
management, employ a universally-applicable form of  rationality has
the potential to reconcile nations and to bring about an awareness of
ourselves as a single humanity. Echoing Marcuse, Ricoeur says that
“the original universality, with its scientific character, permeates all
human technics with rationality.”13 These technics might transform
nations into a true “world civilization” in which all of  us would share
equally in the benefits of  science and technology, as well as increased
prosperity, democracy, and other progressive Enlightenment values.
The negative sense of  universal civilization is the homogenizing
tendency of  rationality, technology, politics, and the economy. For every
advancement brought about by globalization, Ricoeur says it “at the
same time constitutes a sort of  subtle destruction . . . of  the ethical and
mythical nucleus of  mankind.”14 The kind of  world civilization we are
creating is “mediocre civilization” that is “wearing away” at the cultural
resources of  the “truly great civilizations of  the world” by creating a
uniform, standardized culture. Ricoeur notes that “everywhere
throughout the world, one finds the same bad movies, the same slot
machines, the same plastic or aluminum atrocities, the same twisting
of  language by propaganda, etc.”15 The triumph of  such a conformist
consumer culture, where everything is identical and everyone
anonymous, would “represent the lowest degree of  creative culture”
and a danger “at least equal and perhaps more likely than that of  atomic
destruction.”16
Ricoeur will return to this contrast between instrumental-
economic reasoning and ethical-cultural values throughout his career.
In his 1983 essay, “Ethics and Politics,” Ricoeur explains that “the
dissatisfaction of  modern man” comes from conflicts we experience
from being both economic and political agents. The contradictions
that individuals and nations experience are that the very technological
order in which they must participate to survive at the same time
undermines and erodes the ethico-political core of  historical
communities. We find ourselves trapped in between two competing
rational orders: the new rationality of calculating efficiency and the old
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rationality of  our shared cultural and political life.17 Technology thus
continues to be calculating technological rationality for Ricoeur.
The problem with this pessimistic view is that it is unoriginal,
limited, dated, and false. There are too many different things we call
technology to be captured by the notion of  a single technological
rationality that ostensibly underlies them all. The empirical approach
to technology studies understands it hermeneutically and contextually:
technology must be interpreted against a cultural horizon of  meaning,
like any other social reality. When technology is viewed in this manner,
Ricoeur’s work becomes extremely helpful for understanding it
philosophically – in spite of  his own unoriginal views on the subject.
Ricoeur’s hermeneutic philosophy provides a model for interpreting
the meaning of  technological practices; his idea of  a hermeneutic arc
provides a way of  mediating between the technical and social dimensions
of  things; his narrative theory helps to show how technology figures
into the stories of  our lives; and his moral-political philosophy provides
a framework for evaluating the rightness and appropriateness of
technology. If  the password for Ricoeur’s hermeneutics is “mediation,”
then it might help us to interpret the various ways that artifacts mediate
experiences – and the ways we can respond to it given our limitations.
Ricoeur contributes to a philosophy of  technology in at least four
ways.
The first contribution is the model of  the text as a paradigm
for the linguistic mediation of  experience. A technology on this model
is like a text: it is readable, with a meaning that is independent of  the
intentions of  the original creators and users. Like any object, a
technology is given against a background in terms of  which it gains
meaning. A device or system is what it is in relation to its use-context
and broader cultural context. Technologies are, therefore, open to the
same fate as any other human creation. They are open to multiple,
often conflicting, interpretations of  their nature and meaning. Don
Ihde has already taken steps in the direction of  applying Ricoeur’s notion
of  indirect, mediated experience to our experience of  technology.18
Our experience is technologically-mediated when, for example, we view
the world through glasses, talk on a telephone, tell time on a watch, or
read a speedometer. Ihde notes how devices that are read exhibit the
hermeneutic character of  a technology particularly well. On Ricoeur’s
model of  the text, what is referred to is referred by the text and is
referred to through the text. Following Ricoeur we can say that, in the
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case of  technologically-mediated experience, what is referred to is
referred by the instrument through the instrument.
A second contribution of Ricoeur is the model of the
hermeneutic arc. The opposition in the philosophy of  technology that
is crying out for mediation is that between the technical properties of
a thing and its social meaning. Technologies have multiple social
meanings relative to use and context yet technically-explicable functions
that are value-free, non-contingent, and a-contextual. (An automobile,
for example, is both a machine with mechanical features, but also a
device with layers of  social meanings). We could follow Ricoeur and
draw an arc from one side of  the opposition to the other that would
allow us to see how the technical influences the social, and the social
influences the technical – without reducing one to the other. All
technologies could then be seen as, at the same time, composed of
intertwined technical and social considerations. Following Ricoeur’s
version of  mediation, whenever one pole of  the technical-social pair
becomes over-emphasized, we can always restore a richer sense of
meaning by emphasizing its opposing pole. In this way we can still
retain an admittedly useful dichotomy with reifying it into falsely
opposing ontological categories. A hermeneutic arc drawn between
the technical and social aspects of  things is a dialectical way of
understanding technology, in Ricoeur’s limited sense of  dialectics.
A third contribution of  Ricoeur is a narrative theory of
interpretation for making sense of  all of  the different ways that
technologies figure into our lives. Our devices, systems, and substances
are always there, sometimes operating in the background, sometimes
used deliberately, sometimes accidentally. There are an infinite number
of  stories that can be told about the ways that the innumerable things
we make and use figures into our lives. Stories about technological
development, for example, help us to understand how and why a
technological device or system is designed the way it is. Often just
telling the story of  how something comes into being reveals previously
hidden actors, the conscious and unconscious decisions made, economic
and political motives, and technical challenges and triumphs. Another
kind of  revealing story is the story of  technological distribution. That
story explains how it is that people have access to technologies, and
what the effects and consequences are on the people who have and
use them. Or perhaps most applicable to Ricoeur are stories of identity-
formation that explain how technologies figure into individual and
shared lives. Most of  the identity-constructions people have are
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inseparable from having and using things. We are who we are in relation
not only to other people but also to technologies. We form our interests,
attachments, hobbies, and vocations through technologically-mediated
practices. One’s very self-conception is developed, in large part, in
relation to technology and the technological environment we find
ourselves in.
There is a large class of  artifacts that we might call “identity
technologies.” These are the manmade objects that are used in the
process of  shaping our self-identities, our means of  identifying others,
our relationships, and our broader social-political identities. These
include everything from mirrors, make-up, medicine, cell phones,
cameras, computers, surveillance equipment, genetic screening, and
the entire technological networks (of  people and things) that contribute
to the different lifestyles, habits, and knowledge of  ourselves and each
other. While it might be possible to determine what we are as human
beings without the aid of  technology (perhaps through philosophical
reflection), it is impossible to determine who we are without
understanding the technologies that establish personal identities,
maintain them, maintain the relationships that constitute identities, and
form the material of  the customs and habits that make us who we are.
Sometimes the story of  technological identity construction is simple,
even trivial (e.g., the basketball player, the knitter, the computer expert),
other times more serious and complex (e.g., the diabetic fast-food
consumer, the war veteran with an artificial limb, the terrorist suspect
caught through surveillance then subject to extraordinary rendition).
Or another non-trivial role technology plays in one’s identity is in the
developed or underdeveloped world. The very concept of  development
attests to the importance of  technology in characterizing entire nations
and affecting the capacities of  individuals and societies to realize their
potential. A life in a society is a life with technology; technology is what
it is through its social uses. The technical and social are inextricably
intertwined.
Finally, there is the contribution of  Ricoeur’s moral philosophy,
concerned equally with living the good life, respecting autonomy, and
institutional justice. While most technologies probably have little effect
on our rights, happiness, and institutions, some technologies do. Some
of  the choices made about devices and technical systems affect our
health, happiness, and autonomy and thus shape the very character of
our individual and collective lives. In this country market forces and
elected officials determine what technologies are adopted and how
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they are distributed and administered. Most of  us have little or no
control over the former; the latter rarely make technology policy a
matter of  public debate. As a result, citizens have little or no say in
decisions that shape and pattern our collective fate. The answer would
appear to be to allow for the democratic participation of  those affected
by a technology or technological systems. Their design, choice,
administration, and distributed should be subject to democratic
processes, if  we truly respect the rights of  individuals and well being
of  communities.
If  we follow Ricoeur, legitimate and desirable technology and
technology policy would derive from the aim to live well with others in
just institutions. All citizens should have a right to participate in the
decisions about technologies that affect autonomy, freedom, and
opportunity, either directly or indirectly through our political
representatives. In addition, since we all have a desire to live well, and
since technologies affect our notion of  the good life, we should be
able to determine, individually and collectively, which technologies we
believe will foster it and which will prevent it. The institutional
mechanisms of  technological research, development, and distribution
would also have to promote social justice – or human capabilities – in
addition to economic or technological successes if  they are to be
considered just institutions. The implication for public policy is to create
the cultural values and institutional mechanisms that would encourage
and enable people to accept or reject technologies or technology policy
where ever we determine our autonomy and ability to live the good life
is affected. The citizen review panels found in Western Europe and
Japan are good models for civic participation in technology policy.19
Arguably, such important and often lasting decisions about
technology should be made by experts, not left to a non-expert citizenry.
Arguably, it is unjust not to let citizens have a voice in the most important
and lasting decisions that effect the public welfare. Ricoeur is again
helpful here. He is keen to point out that all political action is fragile.
Political fragility stems from the fragility of  political discourse itself,
which is never entirely free of  rhetoric and ideology. Ricoeur wisely
links the fragility of  everything political with the political responsibility
held by every member of  society to exercise prudence and judgment
given the enormous powers of  governments and the enormous weight
our collective decisions and actions might have. Any institution or regime
conferred with the authority to use force is inherently dangerous to us.
We need to be especially vigilant about the powers we confer onto
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political institutions precisely because of  the vital role they play in holding
us together or tearing us apart. Consequently, the call to increase
democratic participation in technology policy would only heighten the
already fragile nature of  governing bodies, and demand even more
responsibility on the part of  us all. Following Ricoeur, we should be at
once more ambitious and more humble in our political aspirations. We
should put technology policy on the political agenda – cautiously yet
bravely.
What the Philosophy of  Technology Adds to Ricoeur
There are two main contributions from philosophers of
technology to the thought of  Paul Ricoeur. The first is to add a material
dimension to hermeneutics. Ricoeur acknowledges that experience is
affected by historical, material conditions but he does not take the next
step and recognize that these material conditions are also textured by
technologies. He comes closer to thematizing the materiality and material
conditions of  hermeneutics than his counterparts, Heidegger and
Gadamer, and his hermeneutic philosophy is more attuned to the needs
of  the social sciences.20 But whenever Ricoeur speaks about this
materiality in the form of  technologies, he falls back on familiar
philosophical frameworks that, ironically, are anything but materialist.
This, I believe, is far from necessary. The step from hermeneutics to
technology is, in fact, very short.
This step toward an empirical philosophy of  technology has
already been made implicitly by most philosophers since the 1950s
who have turned away from Modernist, representationalist epistemology
and embraced some kind of  turn toward language, context, social
practice, or history as the true locus of  meaning. This movement away
from the private interior of  one’s own mind and toward the public
world of  social activity is the key to the connection between
hermeneutics and the philosophy of  technology. Once we recognize
how our technologies texture the environments from which we think
and act, we have opened the door to philosophical reflection on how
technology mediates experience. Philosophers of  technology simply
call attention to this fact, examining how our capacities are embedded
in a social (and physical) world of  artifacts. Ricoeur’s life-long project
to understand human capabilities itself  needs to take a detour through
our various technological forms of  life. By exploring the ways that our
experience is limited by technology – enabled, constrained, empowered,
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and rendered fragile – philosophers can continue to think with Ricoeur,
developing an implicit but underdeveloped dimension of  his work,
while applying it fruitfully to a myriad of  questions concerning
technology.
The second way philosophers of  technology add to Ricoeur’s
work is through their challenge to the Romanticist legacy in Continental
philosophy that too sharply distinguishes between persons and things.
On this view, the human realm must be purified of  anything that
prevents it from being united with itself, with nature, and with God;
conceptual reasoning and detached objectivity apply only to a non-
human realm. Dilthey crystallizes this distinction in the hermeneutic
tradition by distinguishing between two forms of  inquiry: scientific
“explanation” of  the natural world, and historical “understanding” of
the social world.21 Ricoeur concurs with Dilthey that they are two distinct
forms of  knowledge, yet he rejects the claim that each is restricted to
mutually exclusive domains: explanation to the causal world of  facts
and laws, understanding to the human world of  intentions and desires.
Instead, he maintains that explanation and understanding are two
moments in a dialectical unity. Both texts and actions have underlying
structures to be explained as well as social meanings to be understood.
But in spite of  Ricoeur’s attempt to bridge universes of  discourse, he
cannot bridge them completely. He contends that actions in the social
world are both explained and understood, but objects and events in
the natural world can only be explained. Hermeneutics and narrative
theory apply only to human action; natural events and objects are not
the subject of  interpretation or narration, except as props in the stories
of  our lives. They are to be explained following the methodology of
the natural sciences. From the perspective of  the philosophy of
technology Ricoeur remains trapped in the Romanticist legacy. Though
dialectically related, persons and things belong to ontologically distinct
realms.
The contribution of  philosophy of  technology to Ricoeur
(and to most of  20th Century Continental philosophy) is a fresh
perspective on tired modernist dichotomies between persons and things,
social understanding and scientific explanation. Bruno Latour is the
philosopher of  technology who has taken the most radical steps to
overcome the dualistic paradigms that define modernity. For Latour,
the modernist narrative of  progress, which involves the differentiation
of  the natural world (science, technology, and rationality) and the social
world (values, politics, and individuality), is mistaken. The exact opposite
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is happening as science, technology, and society are becoming more
and more connected, not differentiated. This connection is nothing
new: there has never been such a thing as humanity without technology
or technology without humanity. Humans and machines are thoroughly,
and increasingly, intertwined. Any attempt to disentwine them is a
modernist error resulting from a failure to grasp that humans and
machines are forever bound up together in networks of  “sociotechnical
collectives.” Rather than defend the integrity of  humanity from an
encroaching technology, philosophers should instead show how
“imbroglios of  humans and non-humans” occur on an ever increasing
scale.22
While Ricoeur’s philosophy might resist such an attempt to
dissolve the boundaries between the human and the non-human, his
works do offer resources for philosophers engaged in such projects.
Once disabused of  its Romanticist character that, in principle, inclines
us toward a one-sided, pessimistic view of  technology, Ricoeur’s work
offers promise to philosophers of  technology who are trying to imagine
a new relationship between humanity and technology, social
understanding and technical reasoning. Drawing a hermeneutic arc from
humans to machines is one path we might take. Telling stories of
technology that show how technology mediates experiences and figures
vitally into the stories of  our life histories is another path. The task for
philosophers of  technology and Ricoeur scholars is to read our world
critically, understanding its material dimensions from as many
perspectives as possible and to continue to find practical mediations
between humans and machines—remaining mindful that new
mediations highlight our fragility while calling us to responsibility.
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